With his notably calm, reflective manner, 58-year-old Sten Rynning comes across as the archetype of a rational, clear-headed scholar. He’s not easily rattled. But right now the security-policy ground is shaking so hard that even he feels it—viscerally.
»I’m about as close to shocked as you can get,« he says.
No researcher in Denmark has studied NATO as deeply as war history professor Sten Rynning. For more than 25 years at the University of Southern Denmark, he has dissected the world’s most powerful military alliance.
As recently as last year, he published the book ’NATO: From Cold War to Ukraine’ with the renowned Yale University Press, where he describes the development in the first 75 years of the alliance’s history. With something as fate-laden as war and peace as the focal point, each chapter is by definition a piece of dramatic history.
Nevertheless, Sten Rynning describes the chapter currently unfolding hour by hour in real-time as »wild.«
»I never imagined that my old continent would experience such a significant and destructive pressure against the institutions, the EU and NATO, that have brought us so much stability and security,« he says.
And he adds:
»I have children, and I dread what they will grow up with.«
Behind those words lies a cool analysis, where Sten Rynning notes that the normal political process, where knowledgeable diplomacy helps balance various considerations and create a compromise, has been replaced. Instead, a policy now prevails that is based on the inner psychological life of Trump, which in the researcher’s eyes is nothing less than »frightening.«
»It’s emotion, populist appeal, manipulation—and street brawling.«
Does that mean NATO is effectively dead?
»NATO is dying.«
Sten Rynning elaborates:
»If the driving dynamic in NATO is internal conflict and the biggest member threatening the smaller ones, NATO dies. Just read the treaty—it’s not long. It says members must respect the UN Charter’s principles of sovereignty, democracy, and the rule of law. Political reality is moving away from that.«
This shift isn’t just about the threat to Greenland’s sovereignty. Even though Danish politicians agree that Trump has given a militarily complacent Europe a much‑needed wake‑up call, he draws criticism when he says enemies could attack NATO members that underspend on defense without consequence.
Sten Rynning also notes that Trump has shown a willingness to cede Ukrainian territory to Russia without coordinating with Zelenskyy. He has further broken with consensus by inviting Putin to Alaska and by backtracking on the written pledge that Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is »irreversible«.
Add to that the whole »civilizational critique« that Trump and his inner circle aim at Europe, Sten Rynning continues.
Should we nonetheless distinguish between Trump and other institutions, like Congress, where there’s also resistance to his policies?
»Yes, we should. There’s also the Supreme Court. Of course there are still institutions in the United States that can rein Trump in. But they’re slow-acting brakes. With his populist appeal, he’s found a way to operate that mirrors how dictators have communicated throughout history—by bypassing the institutions. And Congress hasn’t, in any meaningful way, managed to stop him.«
Is there nothing to suggest the U.S. will still stay engaged in NATO?
»Yes. They haven’t formally pulled the plug. They’re still embedded in the command structure—for example, they didn’t, as feared, skip appointing a new American general to lead forces in Europe. They also still have troops on NATO’s eastern flank. And the anticipated drawdown from bases, including in Germany, has so far been limited to sending home a single brigade from Romania. That’s why I say NATO is dying—not dead. But even a dying alliance poses a security risk.«
The Danish Defence Intelligence Service has previously warned that NATO’s cohesion is part of the equation that determines whether Russia might move from having the capability to attack to having the risk tolerance to actually launch one.
Hence the question: do Trump’s outbursts against the Kingdom of Denmark now raise the risk that Russia could, in the worst case, mount a conventional attack on NATO’s eastern flank—something the intelligence service has assessed Moscow could build the capacity to do if, among other things, the war in Ukraine hardens into a frozen conflict?
»It’s a significant risk factor. But there’s still too much U.S. presence in Europe—and therefore too much NATO—for this to be a good moment for Russia. If the Russians go into Estonia, they can’t be sure Trump wouldn’t feel humiliated and hit back hard. As long as the china hasn’t been ground to dust, Putin can still cut himself on the shards. But it could lead to more hybrid attacks. And the problem is, Putin has considerable strategic patience.«
Can we hope NATO will heal once Trump’s term ends?
»We’ve seen that movie before—and it’s not coming back. When Biden won, he said the U.S. was back, and we thought Trump was a blip. It turns out Biden was the blip. We don’t know what comes after Trump, but we shouldn’t expect an endless line of Bidens. We should expect a more erratic America—one that’s broken a number of taboos in its transatlantic policy.«
Is NATO essentially split in two, with the U.S. on one side and Europe and Canada on the other?
»It’s worse than that. When American leadership dies, so does the framework that has held together a very diverse Europe, with countries that have different interests and histories. I’d say we can already make out four distinct clubs within NATO: the U.S.; a northern core, where Denmark sits; Southern Europe; and Eastern Europe.«
We’ve talked about the U.S. What characterizes the other clubs?
»The northern core stretches from Canada over countries like the UK, France, and Germany to the Nordic countries that helped send soldiers to Greenland. That group has long had a different perception of the threat from Russia than Southern Europe, which also didn’t send soldiers to Greenland. And then you have Eastern Europe. They agree on the threat from Russia. But neither Poland nor the Baltics were involved in Greenland. We should expect them to sit more on the fence because they are grateful that the Americans pulled them out of the Soviet Union and don’t want to break ties with the U.S.«
»Therefore, we are looking at a heterogeneous NATO landscape.«
Denmark has built its security on the U.S. more than anyone. Where should we find it in the future?
»We have to hope things don’t completely blow up in the U.S. Of course we should try to influence their political debate. But in the end, they’ll choose between some level of collective deterrence across the Atlantic and an ascendant focus on spheres of influence. Which is why we can’t just sit on our hands and wait.«
According to Sten Rynning, there is a need to invest more money in defense. And he recommends creating an organizational superstructure for the northern core that has shown support by sending soldiers to Greenland.
»The organizational superstructure should center around the UK and France, which have nuclear weapons. To be credible, that deterrence must extend all the way down through the structure. Therefore, Denmark would also have to ask itself whether we should agree that French nuclear-armed planes can land at airbases in Aalborg, Karup, and Skrydstrup.«
»It should include some form of European security council with the British and French as permanent members. Perhaps even within NATO if Trump comes to his senses. It could become a strong axis that informally grows into the EU as a concentric circle.«
A fundamental premise for this discussion is that the U.S. is the be-all and end-all in NATO. Can Europe do nothing on its own today?
»The American military is a formidable instrument. From top to bottom, the command structure is geared for efficiency. With a single decision center in the form of the president, who can quickly and robustly issue an order all the way down the military chain. The U.S. can drive, sail, or fly to where the fire is, and they are good at coordinating high-tech attacks by sea, land, and air, as well as in new domains like cyber.«
»Europeans have a system that is complicated from top to bottom. Therefore, it is not efficient. They also can’t drive very far, and when it is necessary, it gets spread thin and less well-coordinated.«
You say NATO is dying. What is the likelihood that NATO will end up dead?
»We’re not getting the old NATO back—the breach of trust runs too deep. So we’re likely to end up with a more European NATO. It’s touch and go. If I had to guess, I’d expect a compromise in which the U.S. doesn’t move to take Greenland, allowing us to keep the institutional framework of collective defense intact. But Trump has gone way out on a limb and left little room for the diplomatic track Denmark tried to open. In any case, it would be irresponsible to slip back into the vulnerability we created by becoming so dependent on the United States.«
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